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THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF FALSIFYING
STATEMENTS MADE TO THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT-A WHITE COLLAR CRIME-FACT
OR FICTION?
Warren H. Hyman *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on the laws affecting the making of false
statements primarily in connection with white collar crimes. Two
statutes cover these types of statements. One, Title 18 of the United
States Code, Section 1001,1 broadly defines statements and entries,
while the other, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1005,2 is
* Assistant Professor of Law, Baruch College, City University of New York.
1. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 749 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) reads
in pertinent part:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
2. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1, 62 Stat. 770 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1982)
reads in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of any Federal Reserve
bank, member bank, national bank or insured bank, without authority from the
directors of such bank, issues or puts in circulation any notes of such bank; or
Whoever, without such authority, makes, draws, issues, puts forth, or assigns any
certificate of deposit, draft, order, bill of exchange, acceptance, note, debenture,
bond, or other obligation, or mortgage, judgment or decree; or
Whoever makes any false entry in any book, report, or statement of such bank with
intent to injure or defraud such bank, or any other company, body politic or corpo-
rate, or any individual person, or to decieve any officer of such bank, or the Comp-
troller of the Currency, or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or any
agent or examiner appointed to examine the affairs of such bank, or the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System--
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
As used in this section, the term "national bank" is synonymous with "national
banking association"; "member bank" means and includes any national bank, state
bank, or bank or trust company, which has become a member of one of the Federal
Reserve banks; and "insured bank" includes any state bank, banking association,
trust company, savings bank, or other banking institution, the deposits of which are
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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more restrictive, covering only false entries made in connection with
banking matters. These statutes are slowly being eroded by courts
attempting to find hidden meanings in what appear to be very
straightforward provisions. These hidden meanings have evolved
into exceptions which threaten to sap the very usefulness of these
sanctions. The various circuit courts have failed to establish una-
nimity regarding the proper interpretation of these statutes, how-
ever, and the debate rages on.
A. The Historical Evolution of 18 U.S. C. Section 1001
The history of the false statement statute can be traced to the
1863 enactment of "An Act to Prevent and Punish Frauds upon the
Government of the United States".3 In the Act, both the presenta-
tion of false claims to the government and the making of false state-
ments for the purpose of gaining approval of false claims were
outlawed. Although broadly worded, application of the statute was
limited to military personnel.' A false claim was prohibited if made
by someone in the military, but it was not specified to whom the
statement had to be made in order to be a violation.'
In the early 1900's minor revisions of the statute were passed6
but these revisions, it was later held, were not broad enough to en-
compass punishments for persons committing frauds on government
corporations created during World War I.' In 1918, the false claims
provision was extended to cover false statements made "for the pur-
pose and with the intent of cheating and swindling or defrauding
the Government of the United States, . . . or any corporation in
3. Act of March 2, 1863, ch. 47, 12 Stat. 696 (codified in R.S. § 5438 (2d ed. 1878)).
The Act reads in pertinent part:
That any person in the land or naval forces of the United States, or in the militia in
actual service of the United States, in time of war, who shall make or cause to be
made, or present or cause to be presented for payment or approval to or by any
person or officer in the civil or military service of the United States, any claim upon
or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer
thereof, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, any person in such
forces or service who shall for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining the
approval or payment of such claim, make, use, or cause to be made or used, any
false bill, receipt, voucher, entry, roll, account, claim, statement, certificate, affida-
vit, or disposition, knowing the same to contain any false or fraudulent statement
or entry...
4. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 505 (1955).
5. Id at 505.
6. In 1908 provisions establishing penalties were amended; Act of May 30, 1908, ch.
235, 35 Stat. 555. In 1909 another revision was made in the penalty provisions; Act of Mar.
4, 1909, ch. 321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 35 (1909)).
7. United States v. Bramblett, 120 F. Supp. 857 (1954), rev'd 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
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which the United States of America is a stockholder . . .".8 Al-
though broadening the application of the Act, the Supreme Court,
in construing this additional provision, limited its focus to "the
fraudulent causing of pecuniary or property loss" to the
Government.9
No further changes were made in the statute until 1934, when
Congress, at the urging of the Secretary of the Interior,'0 removed
the "cheating and swindling or defrauding" language of the 1918
amendment. The 1934 amendment" expanded the scope of the
false statement provision by abolishing the restriction of suits to
cases involving pecuniary or property loss to the Government.' 2 As
a result, a false statement could be covered under the statute pro-
vided it related to a material fact, was knowingly or willfully made,
and came within the jurisdiction of an agency or department. Prior
to 1934, "the law was lacking under which prosecutions might be
had 'for the presentation of false papers.' ",'3 The 1934 amendment
also prohibited this kind of fraud.
In spite of various amendments to the section, courts continued
to be plagued with questions regarding its appropriate scope. The
Supreme Court in Gilliland v. United States'4 found a broad Con-
gressional purpose in enacting Section 1001 which was "to protect
the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies
from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices
described."' 5 However, twenty-five years later, the Eighth Circuit
applied a narrowing intent to the amendments and stated that the
8. Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015.
9. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 92 (1941), United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S.
339, 346-47 (1926).
10. The Secretary of the Interior had sought to prosecute false statements made to the
government during transportation of'hot oil' shipments. Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93-96. Bram-
blett, 120 F. Supp. at 861.
11. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, 48 Stat. 996 states in pertinent part:
Whoever shall make or cause to be made or present or cause to be presented, for
payment or approval, to or by any person or officer. . . . Any claim upon or
against the Government of the United States. . . Knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious, or fraudulent; or whoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal
or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make or cause to be
made any false or fraudulent statements or representations. . . Knowing the same
to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States. . . Shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
12. Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 93.
13. Id. at 94.
14. 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
15. Id. at 93.
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obvious reason for the amendments was "to curtail the flow of false
information to the newly created regulative agencies."' 6
The only change in the false statement statute since the 1934
amendments has been to divide it into two provisions: one, a false
claim provision in Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 287
and the other, a false statement provision in Title 18 of the United
States Code, Section 1001. At least one federal court has been
called upon to deal with violations of both provisions. In that case
the court held: "The very purpose of Sections 287 and 1001 is to
protect the government against those who would cheat or mislead it
"917in the administration of its programs ....
In 1948 the ten-year term of imprisonment for violation of Sec-
tion 1001 was changed to five years in order to "harmonize the pun-
ishment provisions of comparable sections involving offenses of the
gravity of felonies, but not of such heinous character as to warrant
ten-year punishment."' 8 This revision of section 1001 is the last
change in this section to date. 19
B. Purpose of Section 1005
The second federal statute which proscribes the making of false
statements deals specifically with banks regulated by the Federal
Reserve System or insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration. According to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the aim of
this statute is "to give assurance that upon an inspection of a bank,
public officers and others would discover in its books of account a
picture of its true condition. 20
II. PRECONDITIONS TO FALSE STATEMENT LIABILITY
A. Introduction
Violations of both Section 1001 and 1005 include substantially
the same elements,2 ' a false statement of a material fact, within the
jurisdiction of the government or federal agency, and made with
fraudulent intent.22 However, just as there are conflicting views of
16. Friedman v. United States, 374 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1967).
17. United States v. Johnson, 284 F. Supp. 273, 278 (W.D. Mo. 1968), af d, 410 F.2d 38
(1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822 (1968).
18. H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., Sess. (1948).
19. See supra note 1 for text of the Act.
20. United States v. Manderson, 511 F.2d 179, 180 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing United States
v. Darby, 289 U.S. 224, 226 (1932) and United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233, 241 (1909)).
21. J. GLEKEL, BUSINESS CRIMES (1982) [hereinafter cited as BUSINESS CRIMES.
22. United States v. Race, 632 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weath-
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the approporiate scope of the statutes, there is also disagreement
among the circuits regarding the existence of the requirement of ma-
teriality2 3 and the appropriate interpretation of the "statement" and
"jurisdiction" terms.24
B. Statement/Entries
1. Broad Interpretation
The plain meaning of the provision of Title 18 of the United
States Code Section 1001 which reads ". . . any false, fictitious or
fraudulent statements. . ." suggests that Congress intended all false
statements to fall within this portion of the law. In keeping with this
broad interpretation, courts have held that a statement does not
have to be made under oath to be in violation of the statute.25 The
courts have also held that no distinction should be made between
26 ~weoral and written statements, and when the statement is false, the
fact that it is not responsive to the question asked is immaterial.27
Similarly, courts have been willing to read broadly the provi-
sion in Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1005 which
states: "Whoever makes any false entry in any book, report or state-
ment .... -21 The Sixth Circuit, in holding that a false statement in
an inter-office memo was covered, stated: "It seems obvious that
Section 1005 is intended to be broad enough to cover any document
or record of the bank that would reveal pertinent information for
the officers or directors of the bank. 29 In 1982, the Fifth Circuit
also gave a broad interpretation to the above provision when it con-
cluded that false statements made in any document submitted in
connection with a loan application were included.30 At least one
state has passed similar legislation intended to guarantee that the
erspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Glazer, 532 F.2d 224, 228 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 844 (1976); United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452, 454 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
23. See United States v. Aadal, 368 F.2d 962 (C.A. N.Y., 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
970 (1967) (false statement need not be proved to be material); but see Gonzales v. United
States, 286 F.2d 118, (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961) (materiality essential
element of offense).
24. United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006
(1967).
25. United States v. Clifford, 409 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. N.Y. 1976).
26. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 46 (1952).
27. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir 1976).
28. Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 509-10; Gilliland, 312 U.S. at 91-93.
29. United States v. Foster, 566 F.2d 1045, 1052 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1978).
30. United States v. Grugette, 678 F.2d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1982).
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books and records of corporations engaging in the banking business
within its boundaries will reflect the true financial condition of the
corporation.3
2. Narrow Interpretation
On the other hand, courts have found a variety of ways to re-
strict application of the false statement statutes. By far the most
successful technique has been to restrict the scope of the term "state-
ment". The most restrictive interpretation allows the inclusion of
only two categories: first, those false statements made in support of
fraudulent claims and, second, those tending to "pervert authorized
functions of departments and agencies".32 In Friedman v. United
States,33 the Eighth Circuit determined that false statement prosecu-
tions could be classified in four categories:
1. Giving of false information with the purpose of receiving a
monetary or proprietary benefit;34
2. The resisting of monetary claims by the United States by
presentation of false information;35
3. The seeking of some governmental privilege such as employ-
ment or security clearance on the basis of falsified
information;36
4. The giving of false information which frustrates lawful
regulation.37
Another successful limiting tactic has been the use of "ejusdem
generis" as a rule of statutory construction.38 This rule is applied to
determine the meaning of a word by looking at the relationship of
the word to words surrounding it. In this statute, the phrase affected
31. DEL. CODE ArN., tit. 5, § 123 (1974). The statute provides:
Every director, officer, agent, clerk or employee of any institution affected by the
provisions of 122 of this title, who willfully and knowingly subscribes or makes any
false statement of facts or false entries in the books of the institution, or knowingly
subscribes or exhibits any false paper, with intent to deceive any person authorized
to examine as to the condition of the institution, or willfully or knowingly sub-
scribes to or makes any false report, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both. (emphasis
supplied).
32. United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S.
935 (1975).
33. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1976).
34. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
35. United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1962).
36. Marzani v. United States, 168 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1948), af'd by an equally divided
court, 335 U.S. 895 (1948).
37. United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
38. United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190, 206 (D.Md. 1955).
526 [Vol. 6:521
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by this approach is ". . . ." fraudulent statements or representa-
tions. . . ." Much attention has focused on the use of the disjunc-
tive in this provision. The close proximity of these alternative
provisions has led some courts to find that Congress did not intend
to include situations in which the defendants were not legally re-
quired to make the statements, or in which defendants did not vol-
unteer statements for the purpose of making a claim or inducing
improper action by the government. 39 Under this restrictive inter-
pretation, a representation is considered a voluntary statement
rather than a mere passive answer.4°
The requirement that a false statement be aggressively and de-
liberately initiated by the person sought to be charged in order to
come within the meaning of the term "statement" in Section 1001
has prevented the conviction of persons giving false answers in re-
sponse to questions posed by Internal Revenue Service agents.4'
Similarly, this narrow "exculpatory no" exception has also thwarted
attempts to convict persons for lying to agents of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.42
Courts have been careful to define the boundaries of the nar-
row "exculpatory no" exception. In 1980 the Seventh Circuit de-
fined the scope of the exception as "limited to simple negative
answers, . . . without affirmative discursive falsehood under cir-
cumstances indicating that the defendant is unaware that he is
under investigation. . . and is not making a claim against or seek-
ing employment with the government. ' 43 Under this analysis, if a
person is aware of the fact that he is under criminal investigation,
his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination would
require that he receive Miranda warnings and any statement he
made would be outside the scope of Section 1001.
This "exculpatory no" exception has also been applied in the
area of customs interrogations. In most cases the courts have held
that negative answers given to questions posed by customs officials
which were false were not covered by Section 1001. 44 The reason
was that "no aggressive or deliberate positive or affirmative state-
ment" was made.45
39. Id.
40. Paternostro v. United States, 311 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1962).
41. Id. aat 309.
42. Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 208.
43. United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 1980).
44. United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. United States v. Hajecate, 683 F.2d 894, 900 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Statutes in two states cover the making of false written state-
ments.46 However, these statutes are more closely aligned with per-
jury violations since both require that the written instrument bear a
notice to the effect that false statements are punishable. Violations
of both are punishable by fine and/or imprisonment.
C. Jurisdiction
Some courts have been equally creative in finding exceptions to
the false statement statutes by restrictively construing the jurisdic-
tion requirement. By defining an agency's jurisdiction as either in-
vestigative or administrative,47 or by labeling an agency action as
simply a "housekeeping" matter and not a use of the department's
machinery,4 the courts have limited the scope of the statute. How-
ever, concerning the topic of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
explicitly stated that it should not be given a narrow or technical
meaning.49
1. Broad Interpretation
The Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have broadly
viewed the jurisdiction element. The question arises most often in
the context of false information given to agents of the IRS or FBI.
Statements which falsely allege criminal conduct have been found
to carry a "substantial potential for wasting the Bureau's time and
thus perverting its central function . ".. 5o The Fifth Circuit has
decided that Section 1001 is clearly intended to cover situations in
which a person voluntarily seeks out a government agency with a
statement which he knows to be false and which he has every reason
to expect the agency to pursue. 5'
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.45 (McKinney 1975) that provides: "A person is guilty of
making a punishable false written statement when he knowingly makes a false statement,
which he does not believe to be true, in a written instrument bearing a legally authorizedjorm
notice to the effect thatfalse statements made therein are punishable. Making a punishable
false written statement is a class .4 misdemeanor." (emphasis supplied).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1233 (1974) provides that: "A person is guilty of making a
false written statement when he makes a false statement which he knows to be false or does
not believe to be true in a written instrument bearing a notice, authorized by law, to the
effect that false statements therein are punishable. Making a false written statement is a
class A misdemeanor." (emphasis supplied).
47. United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 207-208.
48. Morgan v. United States, 309 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984
(1962).
49. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
50. United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Perhaps the broadest reading of jurisdiction may be attributed
to the Seventh Circuit. In a case defining the limits of the Securities
and Exchange Commission's jurisdiction, the court found that as
long as a statutory basis existed for the agency's request for informa-
tion, Section 1001 jurisdiction was established.5 2 Thus, the court
had no need to put labels on the various functions of the SEC to
limit the application of Section 1001.
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Bryson v. United
States13 appeared to establish a broad interpretation of the jurisdic-
tion element of Section 1001, a significant problem arose. Bryson
involved a false denial of Communist affiliation submitted on an
application to the National Labor Relations Board. Prior to Bryson,
the NLRB filing requirement concerning Communist affiliation was
declared unconstitutional as a Bill of Attainder.54 However, the
Bryson Court, reading a broad definition into the jurisdiction ele-
ment, stated: "it cannot be thought that as a general principle of our
law a citizen has the privilege to answer fraudulently a question that
the government should not have asked. 55 A valid legislative inter-
est in protecting the integrity of official inquiries was given as justifi-
cation for the holding.5 6
2. Narrow Interpretation
The Bryson decision was written two years after the Eighth Cir-
cuit decided Friedman v. United States.57 Friedman had been ac-
cused of violating Section 1001 by volunteering to agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation false information concerning mis-
treatment by an arresting officer. The Eighth Circuit decided that
the investigation of a possible criminal law violation was not a mat-
ter over which the F.B.I. exercises jurisdiction since the F.B.I. had
no power to allow a privilege or grant an award. 58 The Eighth Cir-
cuit clearly pointed out the two opposing views regarding jurisdic-
tion. The majority opinion in Friedman stated: "When the false
statement is made to the Agency with the power to allow the privi-
lege or grant the award, jurisdiction of the agency is established so
52. United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018
(1979).
53. 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
54. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
55. Bryson, 396 U.S. at 72.
56. Id. at 70.
57. 374 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1967).
58. Id. at 369.
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as to warrant a prosecution under Section 1001."59 The court in
Friedman effectively limited the agency functions which could es-
tablish Section 1001 jurisdiction. However, Judge Register in his
dissent sided with the advocates of the plain meaning approach and
found the expansive Congressional purpose to be the protection of
all authorized functions of the government.6° The Supreme Court
relegated Friedman to a footnote in its Bryson opinion and found no
occasion to either approve or disapprove the holding in Friedman .6 1
However, Mr. Justice Douglas, in his dissent in Bryson,62 stated:
"the question of what is 'within the jurisdiction' of an agency should
be construed in a restrictive, not an expansive way. ' 63  Since the
petitioner's union was entitled to his services without the filing of
any affidavit, no valid legislative interest in protecting the integrity
of official inquiries existed.6
Some courts have further restricted the jurisdictional scope of
Section 1001 by distinguishing between the functions of the IRS and
FBI.65 Many courts have determined the F.B.I. role to be merely
"investigative" with no authority to decide and act upon particular
subject matter. But the Seventh Circuit has specifically addressed
the jurisdictional difference between the FBI and IRS. In convict-
ing Otto Kerner, a former governor of Illinois, for making false
statements to the IRS, the court stated: "The IRS differs from the
FBI in that it has regulatory responsibilities in the administration
and enforcement of our self-assessment income tax system. '66 The
enforcement responsibility of the I.R.S. was the key factor in the
establishment of agency jurisdiction under Section 1001.67
59. Id.
60. Id. at 372 (Register, J., dissenting).
61. Bryson, 396 U.S. at 71 n.10.
62. Id. at 73 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 74.
64. Id. at 76.
65. United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Stark, 131 F.
Supp. 190 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 917 (1962).
66. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1157 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
67. At least one state, Florida, has enacted legislation explicitly to cover reports of crim-
inal activity which are known to be false and which are made to any law enforcement of-
ficer. Such a false report is punishable by imprisonment for a year or less or a fine of One
thousand dollars. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.49 (West 1975) that provides: "Whoever willfully
imparts, conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed to any law enforcement officer false
information or reports concerning the alleged commission of any crime under the laws of
this state, knowing such information or report to be false, in that no such crime had actually
been committed, shall upon conviction thereof be guilty of a misdemeanor ofthefirst degree,
punishable as provided in §§ 775.082 or 775.083." (emphasis supplied).
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This restrictive approach to jurisdiction can, however, give un-
expected results. One court has refused to allow the "exculpatory
no" defense in customs interrogation cases due to the "administra-
tive" distinction. In a Tenth Circuit case the defendant was entering
the United States from Canada and was given a declaration form
for customs purposes while he was still on board the plane.68 He did
not declare that he was carrying more than five thousand dollars in
currency on the customs form, and answered "no" when questioned
by the customs official. The court found that the submission of the
form to the defendant while on board the plane was exclusively ad-
ministrative in nature. The "exculpatory no" defense was not avail-
able because there was no showing that the defendant would have
suffered any penalty or sanction in the hands of customs officials, if
he had truthfully reported the currency in his possession.
D. Interpretation of 'Talse"
There has been general agreement upon the proper interpreta-
tion of the "false"element for false statement liability. Material
omissions as well as false statements are explicitly prohibited by
Section 1005.69 While Section 1005 prohibits only false entries by its
terms, it has been interpreted to cover material omissions as well.70
However, the key to a successful charge involving the "false" ele-
ment centers on determining what should be charged in the indict-
ment. Although the objective of both the making of a false
statement and the omission of a material fact may be the same, what
must be proved to establish each offense differs significantly.7 For
this reason, if the prosecution files an indictment charging the de-
fendant with making a false statement, but then at trial proves the
elements of an omission, the indictment must be dismissed.72
An interesting question arises under Section 1005 concerning
the accurate recording of a fraudulent act in the records of a bank.
Most courts say such an entry is not "false" under the statute.7 3 The
Supreme Court has stated: "[T]he making of a false entry is a con-
crete offence [sic] which is not committed where the transaction en-
68. United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980).
69. United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101 (3rd Cir. 1979).
70. BUSINESS CRIMES, supra note 21, at 13.
71. United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1963).
72. BUSINESS CRIMES, supra note 21, at 13.
73. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895); United States v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v. Manderson, 511 F.2d 179
(5th Cir. 1975).
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tered actually took place, and is entered exactly as it occurred."7
Following this interpretation, the Seventh Circuit found: "Although
entries recording fictitious transactions or inaccurately recording ac-
tual transactions are false within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 1005, an
entry recording an actual transaction on a bank's books exactly as it
occurred is not a false entry under that statute even though it is a
part of a fraudulent or otherwise illegal scheme.
E. Materiality
The threshold question under the "material" requirement to
false statement liability is whether or not such a condition exists.
Under Section 1005 there is no express provision of materiality.
Materiality under Section 1001 is explicitly required only in regard
to the knowing and willful falsification, concealment or covering up
of facts, but the statute is silent with respect to false statements.16 If
a court finds that materiality is required, it must then decide what
test of materiality should govern. On this point the circuits are also
divided.
1. Section 1001
The requirement that an omission be material is explicitly
stated in the statute. However, courts have been required to look
back into the congressional history to determine if this requirement
applies to false statements. With the exception of the Second Cir-
cuit, all courts that have addressed the issue have found that false
statements must also be material. Relying upon the plain meaning
of Section 1001, the Second Circuit has consistently held that "the
false statements proscribed by Section 1001 need not be proved to
be material."77 There is no indication in either the committee re-
ports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statute
was to be in any way restricted.7 8
Concerned more with the threat of harsh punishment for trivial
falsehoods, the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have read into the statute the requirement of materiality with re-
spect to false statements. As the Fifth Circuit stated, "Under famil-
iar canons of construction a penal act of the harshness and rigor of
74. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 463.
75. Erickson, 601 F.2d at 302.
76. See supra, note 1 for text of the Act.
77. United States v. Aadal, 368 F.2d 962, 964 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970
(1967). See also United States v. Mahler, 363 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir 1966).
78. McCue, 301 F.2d at 454.
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this one. . . will not be stretched beyond, it will be strictly confined
within, the fair meaning of its terms."79 Unfortunately, in their
zealous protection of the confines of Section 1001, these circuits may
have gone beyond protecting the fair meaning of its terms and un-
necessarily restricted the statute's application.
Having imposed the requirement of materiality on false state-
ments, the problem then becomes how to apply that term. The
broadest interpretation of materiality was stated by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in a case involving statements made to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission. The court held that even preliminary
information given to the SEC to determine the solvency of a com-
pany was material if it might "affect the agency's decision to con-
tinue the investigation." 80
Another test of materiality looks at the intrinsic capabilities of
the false statement itself rather than at what it may possibly accom-
plish.8' The Ninth Circuit has also stated that "the statute serves as a
catch-all, reaching those false representations that might 'substan-
tially impair the basic functions entrusted by the law to [the particu-
lar] agency' but which are not prohibited by other statutes."8 2 This
"substantial impairment" test is the most rigorous of the materiality
tests as evidenced by the case where a mere negative response to an
inquiry by a customs official was held to be material.8 3 The court
held that such a response might tend to prevent customs from fulfil-
ling its administrative duty of requiring persons entering the United
States to fill out reporting forms, and was thus sufficient to consti-
tute perversion of a government function.84
Another test of materiality was adopted by the Fifth Circuit
with the "intrinsic capabilities" analysis. The court in United States
v. McIntosh found that "it is not necessary that the agent rely or act
to a detriment, but the government must show that the concealment
had the capacity to deceive the federal agency. ' 85 The Fifth Circuit
took a more traditional approach in an earlier case when it deter-
mined that if the functioning of a department would not have been
materially affected had it relied on the statement, the statement must
79. United States v. Moore, 185 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1950).
80. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d at 1266.
81. United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1976).
82. United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
83. United States v. Carrier, 654 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. Id. at 562.
85. United States v. McIntosh, 655 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1981).
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necessarily be immaterial.8 6 The Eighth Circuit has likewise
adopted a "natural tendency to influence" test.8 7
2. Section 1005
The case law on the materiality requirement under Section
1005 is scarce. The Supreme Court did not explicitly find that a
false entry must be material but it did state, "The crime of making
false entries . . . with intent to defraud . . . includes any entry on
the books of the bank which is intentionally made to represent what
is not true or does not exist, with the intent either to deceive its
officers or to defraud the association."8 8 Therefore, it would seem
that the materiality requirement would be closely related to the in-
tent issue. It is difficult to imagine any nonmaterial statement which
would be made with the intent to deceive. The Tenth Circuit
adopted this reasoning when it allowed the fact finders to focus on
"whether the transaction is real and substantial as opposed to
merely formal."89
F. Intent
Both false statement statutes clearly state that the wrongdoer
must act with the requisite intent. Section 1005 requires any person
making a false entry in any book act "with intent to injure or de-
fraud"9 and Section 1001 states that a wrongdoer must
"[kinowingly and willfully falsifly], conceal[] or cover[] up ...a
material fact ... "91 in order to be a violation.
1. Section 1001
Several circuits have looked into the question of intent involved
in Section 1001 liability. The Seventh Circuit, in convicting Otto
Kerner of making false statements to IRS agents, found that "Ker-
ner's statements were positive and affirmative, and were calculated
to pervert the authorized functions of the government. 92
86. United States v. Beer, 518 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1975).
87. Blake v. United States, 323 F.2d 245, 246 (8th Cir. 1963) (quoting Gonzoles v.
United States, 286 F.2d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1960)).
88. United States v. Darby, 289 U.S. 224 (1933) (quoting Agnew v. United States, 165
U.S. 36, 52 (1897)).
89. United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 1979), See also Laws v. United
States, 66 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1933).
90. See supra note 2.
91. See supra note 1.
92. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1158.
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The Fifth Circuit in a recent case became involved in determin-
ing the difference between an intent to deceive and an intent to de-
fraud.93 The case involved the false designation of 1150 cases of
bonded scotch whiskey as "vessel supplies" on a U.S. customs form.
The court found that, in order to violate Section 1001, "[tlhe state-
ment must have been made with an intent to deceive, a design to
induce belief in the falsity or to mislead, but [that] Section 1001 does
not require an intent to defraud-that is, the intent to deprive some-
one of something by means of deceit."94 Therefore, as long as a
person intends to manipulate or pervert an agency's functioning by
means of a false statement, they will be found to be subject to Sec-
tion 1001 liability.
No evil intent on the part of the person making the false state-
ment need be proven for Section 1001 liability.95 To willfully make
a false statement, a defendant must have the specific intent of bring-
ing about the forbidden act or pervert the agency's functioning, but
it is not necessary that the government prove that the appellant in
fact had an evil intent.96 Willful means no more than that the for-
bidden act is done deliberately and with knowledge.
The issue of "recklessness" has also been confronted by the
courts in a Section 1001 context. The Fifth Circuit has held that
"[lthe misrepresentation must have been made deliberately, know-
ingly, and willfully, or at least with reckless disregard of the truth
and with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth."97 A per-
son will be deemed to have knowledge of the falsity of his statement
where he exhibits this conscious disregard for learning its
truthfulness.9"
The Second Circuit has also adopted the "recklessness" the-
ory.99 In a case involving a defendant who had allegedly signed his
wife's name to a loan agreement believing that he was authorized to
do so, the court held that "[a] defendant may be convicted of mak-
ing a false statement only if the government proves beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant either knew the statement was
93. United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
907 (1980).
94. Id at 1276-77.
95. Carrier, 654 F.2d at 561.
96. Id.
97. United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1288 (5th Cir. 1976).
98. United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015
(1978).
99. United States v. West, 666 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1981).
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false or acted with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the
truth." 1oo
The intent provision has come under close scrutiny in the cus-
toms area. Once again it is the Fifth Circuit which has been the
most active in this area.10' The issue usually arises when people
entering the United States are unaware of the purpose for currency
reporting and suspect that it might be illegal to transport more than
five thousand dollars in currency into the United States. This mis-
taken belief often negates the intent requirement for a Section 1001
violation. As the Fifth Circuit has stated, "Proof of the requisite
knowledge and willfullness,. . . is almost impossible unless affirm-
ative steps are taken by the government to make the laws' require-
ments known."'' 0 2 Concern for our constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination was the rationale for the Fifth Circuit's warning
that, "[uinless customs officials disabuse travelers of the belief that
bringing currency into the country is illegal, solicitude for fifth
amendment values, prevents us from attaching Section 1001
liability." 10 3
However, the Tenth Circuit has found that a person may ex-
hibit the requisite intent regardless of the government's attempts to
make the laws' requirements known.'04 In a 1980 case the court in-
ferred that the defendant knew of the requirement to fill out the
form when he said he wanted "to avoid a hassle with the ...
IRS." 05 The court also said the "exculpatory no" defense was not
available since the defendant did not show that a truthful answer
would have in any way incriminated him. The Second Circuit went
even further in a similar case and held: "Even where an individual
correctly believes that an answer to an inquiry by a government
agent may be incriminating this does not create a privilege to lie."'"
The Georgia state courts have been called upon to interpret the
intent requirement of their false statement statute. 10 7 The Georgia
100. Id. at 19.
101. United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922 (5th
Cir. 1978).
102. Granda, 565 F.2d at 926.
103. Anderez, 661 F.2d at 409.
104. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874.
105. Id. at 880.
106. United States v. Londono, 553 F.2d 805, 811 (2d Cir. 1977).
107. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-20 (1982) provides in part:
A person who knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact; makes a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
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Supreme Court, in a 1982 case, found that violation of the statute
required an affirmative act on the part of the defendant in order to
comport with the fifth amendment rights.10 s Therefore, an inadver-
tent typographical error was not found to exhibit the requisite intent
to violate the Georgia statute.
2. Section 1005
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret the
intent requirements of Section 1005. 1° It was decided that an intent
to deceive is an "intent to deceive the official agents concerned in
overseeing the bank and supervising its operation and the conduct
of its business .. ."11o Officials included the Comptroller of the
Currency, his agents and any other officials charged with examining
the books and records to determine the financial condition of a
bank.
The Fifth Circuit, in 1979, was faced with the issue of whether
"recklessness" was sufficient to constitute specific intent to violate
Section 1005.1' The court found:
As pertains to Section 1005, however, this court has never held
"recklessness" to be sufficient to satisfy the specific intent require-
ment nor do we think it should. We agree that "recklessness"
may be a reasonable basis in some cases for punishing the mak-
ing of a "false entry" such as where it appears that there has been
a deliberate attempt to avoid knowing whether the entry is fraud-
ulent or deceptive. However, it does not necessarily follow that
in all cases proof of a specific intent to injure or defraud should
be eliminated by a vague generalization equating recklessness
with intent to defraud." 12
It would appear that courts must be very careful to distinguish
between mere negligence and true recklessness in the context of Sec-
tion 1005 violations. Recklessness requires that more than mere
or representation; or makes or uses any false writing or document, knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of state government or of the
government of any county, city, or other political subdivision of this state shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000.00 or by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or both.
108. Marcus v. State, 249 Ga. 345, 290 S.E.2d 470 (1982).
109. United States v. Darby, 289 U.S. 224 (1933); United States v. Corbett, 215 U.S. 233
(1909).
110. Darby, 289 U.S. at 243.
111. United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1979).
112. Id. at 210.
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negligence, carelessness, thoughtlessness or inadvertence be found
before the specific intent element of Section 1005 will be satisfied." 3
III. DEFENSES TO FALSE STATEMENT LIABILITY
A. Exclusivity
The legislative history of Section 1001 is ambiguous concerning
the question of multiple penalties, and there is nothing within its
provisions to suggest that its penal terms must be exclusive.' " 4 The
Tenth Circuit was presented with a case which would have been
proper under Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1001 or
under Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 408, a more spe-
cific and recent misdemeanor statute covering false statements made
for use in determining Medicare payments." 5 The court held that
prosecution under Section 1001 was proper since there was "no indi-
cation of an intent to make the later act a substitute for any part of
the earlier statute."'"1 6
Some support does exist for the defense theory that prosecution
should be under a more specific statute. The Fifth Circuit has
stated, "Given the well recognized antagonism toward general,
open-ended criminal statutes, and the presence here of a specific leg-
islative enactment, the prosecutor might well have proceeded under
the specifically applicable statute, Title 18 of the United States
Code, Section 1005."''7 However, this was dicta since the court re-
versed based on the failure to prove materiality.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Rose
was more specific when asked to rule on whether a single false state-
ment could justify convictions under Title 18 of the United States
Code, Section 1001 and Title 18 of the United States Code, Section
542.18 The court held:
[T]he statute (Section 1001 serves as a catch-all, reaching those
false representations that might "substantially impair" the basic
functions entrusted by law to (the particular) agency, but which
are not prohibited by other statutes. The legislative history
reveals no evidence of an intent to pyramid punishment for of-
113. Id.
114. Anderez, 661 F.2d at 406.
115. United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820
(1976).
116. Id. at 567-68.
117. Beer, 518 F.2d at 173.
118. 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1958).
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fenses covered by another statute as well as by Section 1001." l9
B. Reliance on an Expert
A second defense, based upon a theory of reliance, has been
successful in the area of tax evasion cases. This reliance defense is
designed to refute the government's proof that the defendant in-
tended to commit the offense. 20 The essential elements of the de-
fense are a full disclosure of all pertinent facts to an expert and a
good faith reliance on the expert's advice. 12
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts which have insisted on narrowing the scope of the
false statement statutes profess a fear of harshly punishing trivial
falsehoods. There is concern that the free flow of information be-
tween governmental agencies and private citizens will be stifled if
people are threatened by false statement prosecution. However,
there seem to be two fatal flaws in this scenario. First, it will be only
the makers of intentionally false statements that will have anything
to fear. The others will not be subject to prosecution simply if they
are negligent or careless in their reporting. Second, the self-interest
of the various agencies should work to prevent too vigorous an ap-
plication of these statutes. The FBI realizes its dependence on pri-
vate citizens coming forth with the information and will seek to
balance this need for information against its use of criminal
prosecution.
The courts should not attempt to do piecemeal that which they
feel Congress should have done initially. The fact that the sanctions
for making a false statement under Sections 1001 or 1005 are more
severe than the punishment for making a false statement under oath
is not something which the judicial branch should take upon itself to
rectify.
119. Id. at 1363.
120. United States v. Miller, 658 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1981).
121. Id. at 237.
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